Those of you who have watched the 1966 film “Khartoum” staring Charlton Heston, might recall the very beginning of the movie.

It depicts an Egyptian army, commanded by a British officer, being annihilated by the Mahdi’s army in Sudan.

I’ll be honest, it is a great opening to a great movie (maybe not as good as “Zulu” but pretty close).

It is also based on fact. The battle (although maybe not the way it was depicted) did really happen.

An Egyptian army of 10,000 men, commanded by Col. William Hicks (Hicks Pasha), was wiped out by 40,000 Dervish warriors.  Barely 300 men escaped the destruction.

It would directly lead to the arrival in Khartoum of General Charles Gordon in an attempt to sort out the mess.

Sudan would never be the same again.

This is the story the the Battle of Shaykan and the defeat of Hicks Pasha.

In the early 1880’s a revolt against Egyptian rule broke out in the Sudan.

It was led by Mohammad Ahmad, who proclaimed himself the Mahdi - the expected one in Islam.

Initially, his localised revolt in the Kordofan region was ignored by the Egyptian authorities. However, when his rag-tag army ambushed and defeated an Egyptian army of 4,000 sent to suppress him, the Egyptians sat up and began to take notice.

By January 1883, the Mahdi had captured the main town in Kordofan (El Obeid) which he made his centre of operations. By now his rising had expanded into the neighbouring Darfur region.

So the Egyptians had a bit of a problem in their colony of Sudan.

So what did this have to do with Great Britain and how on earth did they end up fighting on & off in the Sudan for nearly 14 years?

Well, here is my best attempt to tell you succinctly so we can to the story of the battle and the death of Hicks Pasha.

Egypt was nominally part of the Ottoman Empire based out of Constantinople (modern day Istanbul in Turkey).

However, during the 19th century the viceroys of this Ottoman province - the Khedives - started to basically run their own show.

Successive Khedives were keen to modernise and model themselves on the European powers - in particular France.

This included building European style civic buildings, modernising industry and developing a railway system. Part of that modernisation also included building the Suez Canal, which was jointly owned with the French.

As part of their attempt to place themselves on an equal footing with the European powers, the Khedives also sought to create an empire stretching the entire length of the River Nile.

In that effort they took over the countries we now call Sudan and South Sudan (although at the time there was no country by either name) from the 1820’s.

Their rule was never popular, and when the Mahdi arrived on the scene he found many eager to join his jihad against the Egyptians (and other foreigners).

So far so good. But where on earth do the British fit in?

Well, here we go…

In the 1870’s, the ambitious plans by Egypt’s rulers had bankrupted the country.

In a desperate effort to keep the wolves from the door, the Khedive sold his shares in the Suez Canal to the British.

Whilst they now had an interest in the canal, the British still had no interest in Sudan.

Everything changed in 1882.

At the very same time as the Mahdi was seeing off the Egyptian troops sent against him, the army in Egypt itself rose up against the mis-management of the Khedive and his European commercial allies, who were starting to take a hand in running the country to turnaround its ailing financial position.

The revolt was led by charismatic Egyptian officer, Urabi Pasha.

The British felt that their economic and strategic interests (especially the Suez Canal) were threatened by this nationalist rising. Following riots in the coastal city of Alexandria when British nationals were killed and property set on fire, the British intervened.

A British military expedition landed in Egypt.

Led by General Sir Garnet Wolseley, it defeated Urabi Pasha at the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir and restored the Khedive.

Whilst the Khedive was back in control (although nominally still part of the Ottoman Empire), the British stationed an army of occupation in the country to ensure that their interest in the Suez Canal (a vital route to India, the far East, Australia and New Zealand) was never threatened again.

They also took on the responsibility for reforming and re-organising the Egyptian army. It was placed under the command of a British officer - Sir Evelyn Wood VC (one of General Wolseley’s Ashanti Ring of officers).

Britain’s diplomat in the country (Sir Evelyn Baring), going by the unassuming title of “Agent” became to all intents and purposes the power in the land.

So a slightly muddy situation. 

Egypt, nominally part of the Ottoman Empire but whose rulers had been doing their own thing for 60-odd years.

Now that ruler was virtually under British control, but not officially. 

Politics eh?

Meanwhile, down in their colony of Sudan, the revolt against Egyptian rule was growing.

Which brings us to William “Billy” Hicks, otherwise known as Hicks Pasha.

Hicks had been commissioned in the British East India Company’s Bombay Army in 1849 at the age of 19.

He would spent almost his entire 30 year career on the subcontinent, first in the East India Company’s army and then (after the 1857 Revolt) in the British Indian army.

Not surprisingly he fought during the Sepoy or Indian Mutiny and was mentioned in dispatches.

He would also be mentioned in dispatches in his only action outside India.

In 1868 he participated in the Abyssinian campaign under Sir Robert Napier, where he was promoted to the rank of Brevet Major.

Hicks, finally retired from the army in 1880 with the rank of Colonel.

With the situation starting to get out seriously out of hand in Sudan, the Egyptian Khedive was determined to take decisive action.

He also wanted to show the British that he was still both in charge and more than capable of taking his own military initiatives.

Back in London, Prime Minister William Gladstone was all too happy for him to do so.

Gladstone, no fan of imperial adventures, was wary of Britain getting dragged into a war in Sudan, a country that held no strategic or economic value for her. Indeed he was priding himself on recently extricating Britain from their most recent venture in Afghanistan.

Let Egypt do the hard work down there, but….maybe donating a few British officers who were surplus to requirement would bolster the somewhat “iffy” Egyptian army and ensure that Britain were still influencing events.

Rebuilding his army after the rising by Urabi Pasha the previous year, the Khedive was all too aware of his military’s leadership shortcomings and jumped at the opportunity to have some experienced officers on board.

Enter the recently retired Colonel William Hicks.

This was an opportunity to earn some additional cash in his retirement and who knows, if he did a good job he might even be promoted to Commander-in Chief (or Sirdar) of the whole Egyptian army.

I guess he saw this like many modern retired folk see consulting roles.

Hicks arrived in Khartoum and viewed his new army with horror.

The Egyptian army had a reputation of being poorly trained, poorly disciplined and lacking any form of motivation.

With his own eyes he saw this was very much the case.

Part of Urabi Pasha’s uprising had not been about striking a blow for Egyptian independence (although it certainly was), but also because the army had reached the end of their tether.

It was a conscript army, whose members were literally rounded up from their villages.

In a class ridden society, this conscription was focused on the peasant (or Fellahin) class.

Meaning that the Egyptian army was both ill-educated and made up of men who had no desire to be there.

Combine that with a senior officer elite who were totally removed from their men, harsh punishments, pay that was constantly in arrears and an almost complete lack of welfare, it is hardly surprising that the army rose up with Urabi Pasha.

If you think that it was pretty much a rock-bottom army, it got even worse for Hicks.

A large contingent of the men in Khartoum, were soldiers who had risen with Urabi and were now, effectively, on penal duty. Indeed, Hicks was shocked to see many of them arriving in shackles!

Furthermore, these sullen soldiers had no desire to be fighting hundreds of miles from home and coming from the Nile areas of Egypt they dreaded the desert. Which was a bit of a problem in Sudan, because there was a lot of desert out there.

Facing them were the Mahdi’s Ansar (or followers).

Men who were growing in numbers, who knew the land, and who were fighting for God.

Billy Hicks had his work cut out from the word “Go”.

He set to work trying to install some form of discipline, training and confidence in the men.

It says something about his talents, that he was able to take this ramshackle army out of Khartoum to take on the Madhi’s warriors at Sennar to the south of the city.

His 5,000 strong army faced a similar sized enemy and somehow, Hicks Pasha managed to inspire his men to stand their ground as the dervish cavalry charged their line. Overseeing a steady volley fire, Hicks was able to halt that charge just yards from his line.

Under the circumstances it was a pretty impressive result. The Dervish withdrew leaving 600 of their men dead on the field.

But, Col. William “Billy” Hicks would not be remembered for that result.

He would be remembered, and judged, on what was to happen at the battle of Shaykan.

Future commentators often deride his actions at that battle, but that is doing him a disservice.

He is seen as a sub-standard, past his sell by date officer, hopelessly out of his depth, marching around the desert before being destroyed by the Mahdi.

He might not have been a top-drawer general like Garnet Wolseley, but no one at the time raised that concern.

He had an unblemished 30 year military career and had a proven track record as a solid officer, who didn’t take risks and knew his limitations.

With regard to personal bravery, he was no coward either. He had been mentioned in dispatches and he not only stayed with his men at the battle of Shaykan but fought ferociously against the Mahdi’s troops, even making some mounted Baggara Warriors flee. No mean feat!

Hicks’s biggest mistake was not to trust his intuition and argue for it more forcefully.

For a start, despite his victory over the Dervish forces at Sennar, Hicks was fully aware of their limitations.

He telegraphed Cairo suggesting that his army remain in Khartoum and let the Mahdi’s revolt burn itself out 200 miles away down in El Obeid.

The Khedive, however was determined to take action and ordered his commander to advance and engage the Mahdi.

Should Hicks have stuck to his guns?

Maybe but then just how strongly do you protest to the man who pays your (handsome) salary?

Especially when you hope to succeed Sir Evelyn Wood and become the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army?

And anyway, Hicks was 30 years a soldier. Soldiers, especially Victorian ones, marched to the sound of gunfire.

If he had misgivings, he left them behind as he marched his army out of Khartoum in early September.

Certainly, on paper, his army looked impressive.

7,000 infantry (all armed with rifles - unlike the Mahdi’s troops), 1,000 cavalry, 14 artillery pieces and 6 Nordenfeldt machine guns.

Accompanying the army were over 2,000 camp followers along with 5,000 camels and about 1,000 mules and donkeys carrying their supplies.

It was the biggest army every seen in Sudan….there was just one problem…it was still an ill-trained, demoralised Egyptian army at heart.

Modern weapons only go so far, you need well-drilled, determined men using them.

The only men Hicks could really be relied on were the 11 European officers on his staff and the cavalry made up of irregular Bashi Bazuks.

The Bashi Bazuks, recruited from Turkey, Albania and northern Sudan had a fearsome reputation throughout the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East.

Their reputation for bravery was only matched by their reputation for brutality and ill discipline.

But at least they would fight.

Following the White Nile, Hicks planned to then dash across the forlorn, waterless landscape of Kordofan by the shortest route to El Obeid.

However, for a second crucial time, Hicks Pasha, didn’t follow his instincts.

Upon assuming command of the army in Khartoum, Billy Hicks had installed as civil Governor-General, Ala ad-Din Pasha. The Governor-General was accompanying this expedition and persuaded Hicks Pasha to veer away from his preferred route of advance.

Instead of taking the shortest route across the waterless scrubland, Hicks was persuaded to take a longer route, along a dried up watercourse, which Ala ad-Din Pasha argued might still have some water pools and wells.

It was to prove a fatal mistake.

There was no water source and the longer route used up what water supplies Hicks had brought with him. 

As his army toiled through the burning sun (with daytime temperatures in the the mid 30’s celsius (mid 90’s Fahrenheit), they eventually came to a dense acacia forest.

Hicks had been relying on local guides to get them through the wilderness to El Obeid, which was still 30 miles away.

The desert was no fun but at least you could see your enemy.

This forest, with its dry valleys and scrub was something all together different - ideal ambush country.

Was this really the best route, or had the guides  deliberately led him into a trap?

If he was perturbed he kept those feelings to himself and ordered his army to advance.

It was the 3rd November 1883.

Initially, the journey went well.

There was no sudden attack from thousands of fearsome Dervish warriors.

However, Hicks was taking no chances.

That afternoon, still very much in this semi-arid forest, he ordered his men to construct an earthwork encampment to protect them that night.

In the gathering darkness, shots suddenly rang out from the forest.

The Egyptian forces dived for cover behind their hastily constructed ramparts.

More shots…and more….from every direction.

The Mahdi’s forces had indeed laid a trap and had used the cover of the vegetation to surround the camp.

The Battle of Shaykan had started. It would last for the next 36 hours.

Throughout that long night, the Ansar riflemen fired into Hicks’s positions.

At that range and with the size of the Egyptian army it was like shooting fish in a barrel.

All night, the sounds of rifle fire were were accompanied by the whack of bullets hitting flash and the cries in agony of both men and terrified animals.

As the sun rose the following morning, Hicks prepared his men for the inevitable Dervish charge.

However, unbeknown to Hicks Pasha, the Mahdi himself had arrived with the reinforcements.

His army, surrounding Hicks, now numbered 40,000.

That was some trap!

Muhammad Ahmad gave orders for his men to hold back.

He assured them that he had received a vision from God promising them victory. Indeed, he went on to tell them that in his vision they would be accompanied by 40,000 angels with raptor-like feet who would sweep down on their enemy.

Surrounded and outnumbered by over 4:1, Hicks, the Mahdi assured his army,  was going no where.

Let the Egyptians and their European officers weaken in the sun.

For the whole of the 4th November, Hicks’s army remained pinned down in the Kashgil forest.

Throughout the long, hot day the Dervish marksmen kept up a rate of fire that was so intense that it striped the tree trunks of their bark.

With no water source and little shelter from the sun, his supposedly superior army started to wilt…just like the Mahdi intended.

The night brought no respite. It was simply a repeat of the night before.

Hicks realised that this could not continue for another day. He would have to make a break-out.

At 10am on the 5th November, he formed his men into three large squares.

One at the front supported by two slightly behind.

He ordered his dehydrated, demoralised men forward.

They left hundreds of dead comrades and camels where they had fallen.

They even left some of their artillery, whose entire crews had been killed.

For an hour they staggered through the rough ground and acacia trees.

And then, suddenly horns sounded through the forest and the Mahdi’s ansa warriors charged.

If the Nordenfeldt machine guns were brought into action they made no impact as the Mahdi’s men sprinted on foot and charged on horses over the short distance separating the two sides.

The first charge crashed into the leading square, which buckled under the ferocity of the attack.

As it gave way, the men in the supporting squares fired blindly into their retreating comrades.

In this moment of mayhem more horns sounded and with a roar, thousands of Dervish warriors descended on the rear squares from the sides and from behind.

Any semblance of order amongst the Egyptians broke down and the battle descended into vicious hand-to-hand fighting.

The outnumbered Egyptians were fighting for their lives against men driven by religious fervour and armed with double sided swords, daggers and 10 foot long spears.

The only organised resistance was provided by the 11 European officers and the Bashi Bazuk cavalry.

The latter lived up to their reputation fighting to the bitter end.

Of Hicks’s army of 10,000 men, only 300 managed to escape to get back to the safety of Khartoum.

One of those survivors  was the Pasha’s cook who later claimed to have seen the commander’s last moments.

Hicks Pasha was supposedly the last European officer to die.

He emptied his revolver three times as he fought the enemy.

With no more ammunition, he drew his sword and charged at his attackers.

Hie charge was so furious that the opposing Baggara cavalry turned their horses and galloped away to avoid him.

Eventually Hicks Pasha was struck by a spear and dropped to the ground, dead.

200-300 Egyptians tried to avoid the slaughter by hiding under the bodies of the dead but they were flushed out by the Ansar warriors and were taken to El Obeid, as you will hear in a moment.

The victorious Dervish army spend a couple of days scouring the battlefield seizing anything of value, not least 7,000 rifles, 14 field guns and 6 machine guns. Quite a haul for a rebel army!

Then with the stench of the dead becoming unbearable, they marched back to El Obeid.

They paraded victoriously through the town, pulling the captured artillery.

Behind them came those captured Egyptian survivors.

Striped naked and with ropes around their necks. They were met with derision, spitting and beatings.

Most were then executed but a minority were left to beg in the streets of the town, where they died of starvation.

Finally, the Mahdi himself entered the town in triumph on a white camel.

His vision of victory had come true… although without the raptor-clawed angels.

And it was a massive victory.

For the loss of just a few hundred of his warriors he had annihilated an army of 10,000 Egyptians armed with the latest European weapons.

The public in Britain were shocked at the size of the loss. Lord Fitzmaurice told parliament that there hadn’t been such a complete destruction of an army since “Pharaoh’s host perished in the Red Sea” chasing Moses and the Israelites.

For the followers of Mohammad Ahmad, the victory at the battle of Shaykan (sometimes called the battle of El Obeid) proved that he was the Mahdi.

But it did more.

It turned his revolt from a localised effort in Kordofan and Darfur into a liberation movement against the Egyptians.

The Egyptians, who now, incidentally, had virtually no forces left in Sudan.

The country was at his feet…and he now had a modern European arsenal for his army to use too.

His victory also emboldened others in the country to join his cause. Over in the Red Sea coastal area  the local leader, Osman Digna, laid siege to the Egyptian garrisons at Tokar and Sinket.

Egyptian control of Sudan was evaporating and nothing could realistically stop the Mahdi capturing the capital, Khartoum.

The Egyptians, in desperation, now turned to the British for help.

Whilst, Prime Minister Gladstone was still loathed to get involved, the British press took a different stance.

If Gladstone wouldn’t send a British Army then at least send a competent British general to restore the Egyptian’s fortunes.

The printing presses turned and their headlines screamed:

“Send for Chinese Gordon”.

And the rest, as they say is history.

Join me next time as I tell you the story of General Charles Gordon in Khartoum.

But in the meantime, thanks for joining me today, keep well and I look forward to telling you another story from British history very soon.